related topics have also recently appeared.2 Relatively few historical studies, however, address the subject of Austrian liberalism per se,3 and those which do are mostly broad surveys.4
Aside from these general studies, our detailed knowledge of the subject -such as it is -rests on scattered articles, chapters or segments of chapters in general histories and monographs, and a handful of Austrian disserations.5
In this essay I propose to broadly evaluate the existing literature on Austrian liberalism, and to advocate, as well, some new directions for research; in the process I will frequently address the question of current scholarship on liberalism in general, and occasionally touch on the situation with regard to regions other than Austria, particularly Germany and Britain. My remarks will deal more with ways historians have thought about liberalism and might think about liberalism than with liberalism itself. It is no doubt preferable, as someone has said, to supply one concrete answer than a host of proposals for further research; the fact remains that the important subject of Austro-German liberalism has hitherto been on the periphery of historians' research agenda. In this case, a reconsideration of conventional generalizations would seem to repay the effort.
It is not difficult to see why the subject of liberalism in Austria has been neglected. It is a fact, after all, that proponents of liberalism in Austria never succeeded in defining their aims in a the history of the liberal party coalitions in the Cisleithanian parliament. The scholarly and popular essays of Adam Wandruszka must also be noted, especially "Osterreichs politische Struktur," in Heinrich Benedikt, ed., Geschichte der Republik Osterreich (Vienna, 1954). Wandruszka has been very important for establishing a widely-accepted sense of liberalism's place in the sweep of modern Austrian political history. His conception of a dialectical conflict between liberalism and its "post-liberal" antitheses -nationalism, socialism, and Christian socialismhas been so thoroughly assimilated over the past twenty-five years that his work is often no longer specifically cited. His essay on "Osterreichs politische Struktur" is an impressive synthesis -possibly the key source in the contemporary network of literature about modern Austrian politics -but too many historians have accepted it uncritically as the final word on liberalism.
5. It should be said that a number of recent monographs which focus on subjects other than liberalism contain much valuable information on liberalism itself -e.g., Heinrich Lutz, Osterreich-Ungarn und die Griindung des deutschen way which appealed to the broad public,6 and that organized liberalism enjoyed only a fleeting taste of parliamentary leadership -based on a severely limited franchise -in the 1860s and 1870s. On these grounds alone, it is perhaps not surprising that Austrian liberalism should often be overlooked, or dismissed as a historical curio and political dead end. Moreover, for obvious reasons the focus of attention in central European studies in recent years has been on National Socialism and its origins in late nineteenthcentury radicalism and "cultural pessimism"; there has been little incentive for either senior or apprentice historians to study a movement such as liberalism, whose values are widely alleged to have been overwhelmed and transcended in the early twentieth century. John W. Boyer's new study of Viennese Christian Socialism, cited above, deals extensively with liberalism and constitutes in some respects an important advance over previous literature, insofar as it takes seriously some of liberalism's positive achievements. Still, even here liberalism is not given center stage, but functions as a foil for "radicalism."
In German history the situation is now improving (see note 17), although until quite recently interest in liberalism was chiefly peripheral, largely confined to charting the reasons for the doctrine's inability to arrest aggressive nationalism, imperialism, political irrationalism, and totalitarianism.7 Indeed, the entire 6. Franz, Liberalismus, p. 239, speaks of the liberals' "theoretical confusion" and striking "lack of political effectiveness." A standard reason given for neglecting the subject is that organized political liberalism never progressed beyond the level of an individualistic Honoratiorenpartei to produce a disciplined "mass party" (e.g., Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 94). If one's focus is primarily on the evolution and success of political parties, it is likely that the nineteenth-century liberal movement -identified with the Verfassungspartei and its fragmented successors -will be interesting, at best, only as a precursor of subsequent developments. Here again, Wandruszka's work has been crucial in establishing the broad frame of reference, even for those not narrowly concerned with party or political history such as Schorske. intellectual climate in recent decades has been fundamentally unfavorable to the study of liberalism -whether it be the Austrian species, the American, or any other variety -simply because the notion that liberalism "died" on the eve of World War I and the idea that its values are "bankrupt" today have become so remarkably widespread and uncritically accepted. In many quarters, liberalism is now automatically handled with heavy irony as yet another idea whose time has come and gone, one whose nineteenth-century disciples were either cynical, self-serving hypocrites or, at best, confused captives of their own pathetic illusions.8 And yet, when we shift our eyes away from the printed page, the contemporary political and economic scene in western Europe and North America testifies at least as much to the liberal tradition's vigor as to its decline. Even in the greater part of central Europe, a neo-liberal order flourishes today (partially masquerading, to be sure, under the name of "social democracy"). We must certainly recognize that the establishment of the present order was indirectly facilitated by Hitler, who destroyed powerful, traditional obstacles to liberalism; that it was introduced under the eye of western occupation; and that it was rendered especially attractive to the native population by the shadow of Soviet tyranny. Still, the fact that it not only exists, but apparently flourishes and expands, suggests that it is not merely the product of coercion or expediency, and that native traditions may somehow be involved. I would like to suggest -while recognizing that theories of liberal as well as illiberal Kontiniutdtslinien in central European history run liberalism's "failure." Sheehan, for example, cites "liberalism's larger failure to shape German politics and society" (p. 177), while Ralf Dahrendorf's widely criticized but nonetheless influential Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, 1967) is about "Germany's persistent failure to give a home to democracy in its liberal sense" (p. 14). The key images and phrases used to explain liberalism today -e. g., "paralysis," "decline," "myopia," "bankruptcy," and perhaps the most threadbare of the lot, "crisis" -are basically the ones introduced before the Great War.21 Obviously, historians cannot ignore the imagery and texture of the language used by people they study; in the case of liberalism (traditionally associated with selfexamination and toleration of heretical viewpoints), turn-of-thecentury liberals were themselves among their own best critics. Still, whatever advantages the historian enjoys over the subjects of his study he owes largely to refinements of vocabulary, diction, and syntax made possible by hindsight. The fact is that historians of central Europe have been unimaginative in searching for a fresh linguistic framework of analysis to explain nineteenth-century liberalism, and often have not been very thoughtful in using the language they have inherited.
Closely associated with the problem of terminology is the question of periodization. I have already alluded to the obvious but nonetheless frequently ignored pitfalls of mechanically dividing "periods" into "early," "high," and "late" phases of development, a practice inspired by the analogy of the life cycle with its stages of "growth" and "decadence." Despite the current fashion of emphasizing "continuity" in central European studies, for explanatory purposes most historians continue to rely heavily on the practice of packing time into descrete "eras" or "epochs." There is genuine irony in the fact that historians of Austria -in stark contrast to the slight long-range importance they generally attribute to liberalism -often refer to the 1860s and 1870s, or even to the entire period between 1867 and 1918, as die liberale Ara or das liberale Zeitalter.22 This well-worn convention is a legacy of Friedjung's generation. In Austrian history, the financial crash of 1873 is typically depicted as a symbolic event which sounded the death knell of the "liberal era." Unquestionably, liberalism as a political creed lost much of its elan after the 1870s. Nevertheless, the practice of conceptualizing events in terms of self-contained "epochs" is fraught with danger, especially insofar as it can serve as a way to quietly suggest that past approaches to problems are "transcended" by "history" and lose all relevance for the future.
In the space remaining I wish to draw attention to three important but neglected areas of study: biography, the relationship of political and intellectual history to economic history, and the subject of progressive (or "neo") liberalism.
Perhaps most striking of all in this connection is the slight attention paid to biographical research on Austrian liberals, either as individuals or as a group. Broad generalizations about "liberalism" and the group psychology and behavior of "the liberals"abound, but we really know remarkably little in detail about individual liberals -their life histories, personalities, and unique sensibilities. Even in Austria it is difficult to find recent biographical studies. In some instances this situation may be attributed to a lack of documentation, but in many cases it simply reflects the fact that archives and libraries have not been combed with a view to liberal biography.
In Austrian economy were largely content to adapt their data to general theoretical frameworks, particularly the widely held notion of a "great depression" in Europe between 1873 and 1896.28 The key event in this cataclysmic configuration of events is the Vienna stock market crash of 1873. In Austrian historiography, the great Krach carries a heavy load of symbolism; almost universally, it is represented as having shaken "middle-class society" -and its liberal political leadership -to the roots, and it is conventionally used as a device to signify the onset of liberalism's demise.
The practice of unreflectively invoking the "great depression" thesis as a ready-made device for explaining liberalism's "decline" has become so commonplace as to arouse a certain measure of skepticism. What if there were no "great depression?" In the case of Britain, it has in fact been argued that the idea is a myth, 29 not one of them. In this respect, it perhaps is often not so much the liberals themselves as some of their historians who should be viewed ironically. If, after having reconsidered the subject of late nineteenth-century Austrian liberalism, it proves impossible to imagine its history in the reconciliatory terms of high comedy, it may at least be possible to avoid the teleological cliches of specious "tragedy," the pathos of middlebrow journalism, and the conceit of glib irony.
